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Summary 
Tourism plays a major part in the development strategies of both developing and 
developed countries because of the alleged potential of generating foreign exchange, 
economic growth and welfare enhancement (Sinclair and Stabler, 1997; Sinclair, 1988). 
Consequently, in several countries a considerable amount of resources is allocated to 
further promote the tourism sector in a hope of reaping more economic benefits. 
However, it is still debatable whether tourism is beneficial for the tourist-receiving 
country or not. While empirical studies (Adams and Parmenter, 1994; Zhou et al., 1996, 
Baaijens et al., 1998; Blake, 2000; Blake et. al., 2003; Dwyer et al., 2003), argue that 
tourism expansion is beneficial to the economy, theoretical studies (Copeland, 1991; 
Chen and Devereux, 1999; Hazari and Nowak, 2003; Hazari et al., 2003; Nowak et al., 
2003) posit that tourism expansion can be immiserizing. This paper critically reviews 
the theoretical and empirical literature to identify the sources via which tourism 
expansion can benefit or harm the economy. The issues are then empirically 
investigated using a CGE model for Mauritius to identify the conditions under which 
tourism expansion can be immiserizing. 
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Tourism plays a major part in the development strategies of both developing and developed 
countries because of the alleged potential of generating foreign exchange, economic growth 
and welfare enhancement.
1 Consequently, in several countries considerable amount of 
resources are allocated to further promote the tourism sector in a hope of reaping more 
economic benefits. However, it is still debatable whether tourism is beneficial for the tourist-
receiving country or not. While empirical studies (Adams and Parmenter, 1994; Zhou et al., 
1996, Baaijens et al., 1998; Blake, 2000; Blake et. al., 2003; Dwyer et al., 2003), argue that 
tourism expansion is beneficial to the economy, theoretical studies (Copeland, 1991; Chen 
and Devereux, 1999; Hazari and Nowak, 2003; Hazari et al., 2003; Nowak et al., 2003) posit 
that tourism expansion can be immiserizing. This paper critically reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature to identify the sources via which tourism expansion can benefit or harm 
the economy. The issues are then empirically investigated using a CGE model for Mauritius 
to identify the conditions under which tourism expansion can be immiserizing.  
 
The analysis of tourism expansion is similar to the analysis of an export boom and follows 
closely the ‘Dutch disease’ literature (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984). ‘Dutch 
disease’ refers to the negative effects of the export boom, due to new discoveries of natural 
gas of the 1960's, on the Dutch economy arising from the subsequent appreciation of the 
Dutch real exchange rate. However, as noted by Copeland (1991), there are crucial 
                                                 
1 See Sinclair and Stabler (1997) and Sinclair (1988) for a review of the economic and non-economic benefits of 
tourism growth. 
  1differences between tourism exports and traditional exports that require additional insight to 
the ‘Dutch disease’ literature in order to analyse tourism expansion. Copeland identifies three 
major differences. First, consumers (tourists) move across the boundaries to consume the 
commodity rather than sending goods across the boundaries as in traditional exports. 
Consequently, non-tradables such as accommodation services become tradable in the sense 
that they generate foreign exchange. Therefore following the ‘Dutch disease’ literature, a 
tourism boom will not only affect the non-traded sector indirectly via the spending effect, but 
there will also be a major direct effect since tourists consume non-traded goods at domestic 
prices. Moreover, tourism taxes will have direct effects on domestic consumption, and 
similarly domestic taxes will also affect tourism exports. 
 
Secondly, the tourism product consists of a bundle of goods and services for which tourists 
assess the cost as a whole before deciding to visit the destination. Therefore, the tourism 
consumption decision can be regarded as consisting of two stages: one is whether to visit the 
country or not and the second is how much of each commodity they should consume once 
they are at the destination. We refer to the former as the macro tourism demand choice and 
the latter the micro tourism demand choice. This is discussed further in the description of the 
CGE model.  
 
Thirdly, the tourism product is also consumed jointly with other unpriced natural amenities 
such as climate and scenery, and public goods such as defence and street lighting. The natural 
amenities form part of a destination’s tourism assets, and differentiate tourism products across 
countries. The Grand Canyon, Niagara Falls, the beaches of Mauritius and of the Caribbean 
are the assets that make tourism destinations at these places distinctive. A very important 
implication is that tourism exports can no longer be modelled under the small country 
assumption, even for small countries. The demand for a given country’s tourism exports is 
less than perfectly elastic because tourism products are differentiated across countries. 
 
The next section of the paper reviews the ‘Dutch disease’ literature and a critical evaluation of 
the existing empirical and theoretical literature on tourism booms in order to identify the 
potential effects of a tourism boom on the economy. Section 3 describes the features of the 
CGE model for Mauritius including the treatment of tourism and the associated assumptions. 
Section 4 provides an empirical evaluation of a tourism boom in Mauritius highlighting the 
  2conditions under which tourism immiserization is possible. Finally, section 5 offers some 
concluding comments.  
 
2. THE EFFECTS OF A TOURISM BOOM  
There are several studies providing a theoretical analysis of the possible channels through 
which a tourism boom can affect the economy both positively and negatively (e.g. Copeland 
1991, Chen and Devereux 1999, Hazari and Nowak 2003, Hazari and Ng 1993, Nowak et al. 
2003). Most of these studies follow the ‘Dutch disease’ literature in some way and are 
investigated using general equilibrium trade models. The main channel through which a 
tourism boom effects the economy is through a terms of trade effect. Tourists consume 
products that are otherwise non-tradeable, and demand for these products will increase 
following the tourism boom
2. Thus the relative price of non-tradeables will increase causing 
an appreciation in the real exchange rate and an improvement in welfare. Copeland (1991) 
argues that the price increase will be reinforced in the second round effect from additional 
domestic spending induced by the increase in real income. It should be noted that unlike a 
traditional export boom, there are both a direct and indirect effect on the non-tradeable 
market. The increase in the terms of trade will have similar spending and resource movement 
effects as in the ‘Dutch disease’ literature, welfare will increase overall since without 
distortions immiserization is not possible in the ‘Dutch disease’ framework.  
 
The core model of the ‘Dutch disease’ economics is presented by Corden and Neary (1982) 
and Corden (1984), and the effects of an export boom are separated into two parts: the 
spending effect and the resource movement effect. An export boom increases domestic income 
causing an increase in the demand of both tradeables and non-tradeables. This will result in an 
increase in the price of non-tradeables, but with the small country assumption, the price of 
tradeables will not change. The relative price of non-tradeables to tradeables rises (i.e. an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate), making the production of non-tradeables more 
attractive than tradeables. With resources drawn away from the tradeable sector to the non-
tradeables sector and with the increase in demand for importables being mostly met by higher 
imports financed by higher exports, the output of tradeables must contract. This is the 
spending effect. The resource movement effect is initiated by an increase in the marginal 
product of labour in the booming sector causing an influx of labour from the non-tradeable 
                                                 
2 As Corden (1984) has noted, the export boom could also happen from the supply side such as an exogenous 
improvement in technology or a windfall discovery of resources as in the original ‘Dutch disease’ case. An 
increase in supply will initially reduce the price of non-tradeables, causing a real depreciation. 
  3and tradeable sectors. This is referred to as direct de-industrialisation. The reduction in labour 
in those sectors causes a reduction in output and an excess demand emerges in addition to the 
spending effect. The price of non-tradeables increases causing a further movement of labour 
away from the tradeable sector but this time towards the non-tradeable sector. This is referred 
to as indirect de-industrialisation arising from an appreciation in the real exchange rate. The 
above effects are based on a set of restrictive assumptions. 
 
Krueger and Sonnenschein (1967) proved that in the absence of distortions, an improvement 
in the terms of trade is always welfare improving. This relationship breaks down in the 
presence of distortions. In the presence of monopoly in the non-traded sector (Lahiri and Ono, 
1989), international imperfect competition (Markusen, 1981), foreign ownership of factors 
(Bhagwati and Tironi, 1980; Micheal, 1992), wage differentials (Batra and Scully, 1971), 
trade taxes (Woodland, 1982, chap. 9; Lahiri and Ono, 1989), it is seen that an improvement 
in terms of trade may not always be welfare improving. These conditions may also lead to a 
reduction in welfare following a tourism boom. A tourism boom has been investigated under 
the some of the above conditions and the outcome is sometimes debatable.  
 
The terms of trade effects when the non-traded sector has domestic monopoly power is 
discussed in Lahiri and Ono (1989) and Cassing (1977). Lahiri and Ono found that increases 
in TOT for a competitive tradeable can reduce welfare if the output of non-tradeable falls 
causing a reduction in monopoly profits (assuming constant return to scale) which outweighs 
the increase in exports, especially when the export sector is small enough. A tourism boom 
will expand the non-tradeable sector that provides tourism goods and services and contracts 
the other non-tradeable sectors. If the latter sectors have monopoly power and the tourism 
sector and the tourism sector is small enough, the tourism boom can be immiserizing. 
However, if the tourism non-traded sector itself has monopoly power, the situation is 
different. The tourism non-traded sector can often have domestic monopoly power especially 
in developing countries having only a few large hotel chains controlling the market. The 
tourism boom will increase demand which will lead to higher abnormal profits and higher 
welfare. Such analysis is conducted analytically by Hazari and Kaur (1995), who could not 
conclusively determine the direction of change of the price of non-traded tourism goods after 
the tourism boom. In any market structure, with well behaved demand and supply functions, 
an exogenous increase in demand should increase price, leading to an increase in welfare.  
 
  4Under an increasing returns to scale assumption, efficiency gains (losses) will add to (subtract 
from) the welfare effect, depending on which sectors the increasing returns to scale are 
present in. Efficiency of expanding (contracting) sectors will improve (worsen), contributing 
positively (negatively) to welfare. Nowak et al. (2003) show that if the exportable sector is 
the only sector facing increasing returns to scale, a tourism boom can be immiserizing 
because the reduction in output of the exportable can lead to further efficiency losses.  
 
Tourists consume non-traded goods that are also consumed by domestic residents, and a 
tourism boom can lead to a crowding-out effect on domestic consumption causing a welfare 
loss. On the other hand, the tourism boom will increase the terms of trade implying that the 
domestic residents have more consumption possibilities in terms of imports. Hazari and Ng 
(1993) analyse the change in domestic consumption locus following the introduction of 
tourism in the economy, assuming that tourists do not consume imported goods. Part of the 
new consumption locus lies below the pre-boom locus and if consumption takes place on this 
part, welfare will be lower.
3 Similarly, one can make a case for a welfare-improving 
equilibrium. The position of the new equilibrium depends on the preference of local residents 
towards non-traded and imported goods such that a preference for non-traded goods can lead 
to an immiserizing tourism boom. The new equilibrium will also depend on the price ratio. 
The higher the price of the imported good relative to the non-traded goods, the higher is the 
possibility that tourism boom will be immiserizing.  
 
Kemp (1968) found that in the presence of import tariffs, an improvement in the terms of 
trade can never be immiserizing. In contrast, Lahiri and Ono (1989) found that improvement 
in the terms of trade may reduce welfare in the presence of export subsidies especially with 
high subsidy rate, high price elasticity of demand and small amount of export. Chen and 
Devereux (1999) investigated tourism under different trade regimes and decomposed the 
welfare effects into terms of trade and volume of trade effects. The terms of trade effect is 
welfare improving while the volume of trade effect can be welfare improving or worsening. 
Assuming that all goods are normal and are net substitutes from each other in the goods and 
factor markets, the volume of trade effect will be welfare enhancing (reducing) under an 
import tariff (subsidy) and export subsidy (tax) regime. The intuition behind the immiserizing 
case is that a tourism boom expands imports and reduces exports. Import subsidies are 
distortions that reduce welfare, so their distortionary effect is enhanced. Export taxes will, if 
                                                 
3 Proof for the derivation of the curve is given in Hazari and Ng (1993). 
  5exports face a downward-sloping demand curve and the tax is less than or equal to the optimal 
export tax, increase welfare; hence the reduction in exports reduces the positive welfare 
effects of these taxes.  
 
Most studies of the effects of internationally mobile factors concentrate on import tariffs. For 
example, Jones (1984), Bhagwati and Tironi (1980) and Micheal (1992) found that import 
tariffs are more welfare reducing when some factors are internationally mobile than when 
they are not.  
 
The presence of international capital in the tourism sector can lead to a reduction in welfare 
following a tourism boom. Following the Stolper-Samuelson argument, a tourism boom will 
decrease (increase) the relative price of capital to labour, if the tourism sector is labour 
(capital) intensive. This will result to a decrease (increase) in factor income repatriated to 
foreigners and an increase (decrease) in factor income attributed to domestic residents. The 
direct benefits of the tourism boom will hence be larger (smaller) in the presence of 
international capital. As argued by Copeland (1991), if the amount of factor income 
repatriated to foreigners is larger than the tourist spending, a tourism boom can be 
immiserizing. In the case where capital is internationally mobile and the world rental rate is 
given, a tourism boom is still welfare improving. However, the real appreciation is lower 
because international mobility of factors makes supply more elastic.  
 
Most tourism analyses assume that tourism demand is not perfectly elastic. Several studies 
(Fish, 1982; Copeland, 1991; Bird, 1992; Hazari and Ng, 1993; Forsyth and Dwyer 2002; 
Hazari and Nowak, 2003; Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2003) have indicated that most countries 
have some monopoly power over international tourism. Such market power arises because of 
the differentiated nature of tourism products which occur in terms of types and quality of 
attractions, goods and services sold in the country. Some studies including Chen and 
Devereux (1987) distinguish between ‘wanderlust’ tourism, involving seeing or doing 
something that is unique to the destination, and ‘sunlust’ tourism which refers to sun, sea and 
sand destinations. ‘Wanderlust’ tourism tends to exhibit a higher degree of product 
differentiation and hence higher market power than ‘sunlust’ tourism.  
 
In principle, free trade is Pareto improving, but the Stolper-Samuelson theorem shows that 
owners of some factors win while owners of others lose. Krugman (1979) argues that income 
  6redistribution effects under the Hecksher-Ohlin trade model are higher than under the 
intraindusry trade model, but nevertheless distributional effects are significant. Aggregate 
welfare can increase despite deterioration in income distribution if the increase in welfare of 
the richer households is more than the reduction in welfare of the poorer households. For 
developing countries, especially where poverty is eminent, welfare of the poorer households 
are more important and pro-poor tourism strategies are being implemented. In such situations, 
it is important to give a higher weight to poorer households while evaluating the aggregate 
welfare effects, and if the tourism boom does not increase welfare of the poor adequately, it 
can be immiserizing. The tourism sector is generally labour-intensive, and the tourism boom 
will increase relative price of labour to capital which will tend to benefit the poorer 
households. Moreover, the subsequent increase in the price of tourism-related commodities 
and the crowding-out effects on domestic consumption caused by higher tourism consumption 
will tend to affect the richer households more since they consume tourism-related goods more 
than poorer households. Income distribution can also be affected by tax distortions. A tourism 
boom will increase trade tax revenue under the import tariff/export subsidy regime. Since 
generally a higher proportion of tax revenues are redistributed as lump-sum transfers to the 
poorer households, the equity adjusted welfare may increase.  
 
3.  THE COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
We use a single country CGE model, where Mauritius is taken as a small open economy and 
tourism is the only export sector for which the world price is not fixed.  The model is static 
with the conventional neo-classical assumptions, and belongs to same family of models as 
those described by Dervis et al. (1982) and Robinson et al. (1999).  The model explicitly 
captures ten types of taxes, and government balances the budget through adjustment to 
transfer income.   
 
3.1  Model Overview 
This sub-section provides an overview of the nested equation structure of the model (Table 
A.1 in the appendix provides a list of the equations on the model).
4  On the supply side, the 
model includes seventeen sectors each consisting of profit maximizing firms with production 
functions in the form of a Leontief function of value added and intermediate inputs.  The 
value-added component is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of labor and 
capital, each of which is homogeneous, mobile among sectors, internationally immobile and 
                                                 
4 The GAMS/MPSGE code of the model is available upon request.   
  7fixed in supply.  Labor is further decomposed into the unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled 
categories, which are aggregated in a Cobb-Douglas (CD) fashion.  Intermediate inputs, 
which are a CES composite of domestically produced and imported inputs following the 
Armington assumption, are aggregated in a Leontief function.  Output of each sector is split 
between domestic sales and exports using a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
specification.   
 
The demand side consists of the household sector, the government, tourism demand and 
investment demand.  There are eight household groups in the model classified according to 
income level, and each household group maximizes utility in a multi-stage budget process.  In 
the first CD nest, consumers decide on how to allocate expenditure across different sectors, 
while in the second Armington CES nest they decide on the mix between domestically 
produced and imported commodities.  Investment demand is formulated in a similar fashion.   
 
Tourism demand is formulated at two levels: micro tourism demand and macro tourism 
demand.  Micro tourism demand is the demand for goods and services of tourists within the 
destination country, while macro tourism demand captures tourist demand as represented by 
tourist arrivals.  The micro tourism demand is modeled like household demand, with each 
tourist maximizing his/her utility given a budget constraint.  This generates demand of a 
representative tourist already at the destination.  Total tourism demand is then the micro 
demand multiply by the number of tourists in the country.  The latter is captured by the macro 
tourism demand, which incorporates the effect of changes in the relative international price of 
tourism on tourist arrivals on the assumption that other destinations prices are fixed.  The 
price of tourism is a weighted average of the price of tourism commodities in Mauritius 
divided by the exchange rate.  Changes in the price of tourism change tourist arrivals and 
consequently aggregate tourism demand.   
 
The model treats government consumption as a standard demand rather than as public goods.
5  
Normally, an increase in taxation causing an increase in government revenue will increase 
government consumption which in turn will crowd out effect private consumption, resulting 
to a reduction in welfare of the household sectors in addition to the one caused by higher 
                                                 
5 Government consumption is predominantly from the government services sector itself and consists mainly of 
public goods.  However, since we do not have enough data on the valuation of public goods, we treat 
government consumption as a standard demand rather than as public good. 
  8taxes.  To avoid this effect, government consumption is fixed in the model and the budget is 
balanced using adjustment to transfer income.  The dead weight loss of taxation is measured 
as the difference between the reduction in consumer surplus and the increase in government 
tax revenue.  If the increase in government revenue is transferred to the household sector (via 
transfer income), change in household welfare will then measure the dead weight loss of a 
given tax simulation.  However, one limitation of using transfer income is that the 
distributional effect of taxation is sensitive to the proportions in which transfer income is 
allocated to different household groups.   
 
With the small country assumption, the world prices of imports and exports are assumed to be 
fixed, but import prices will change when tariffs and the exchange rate change.  With 
exogenously fixed foreign savings (balance of payment deficit fixed at zero), the equilibrating 
mechanism at work is the exchange rate.  Changes in the exchange rate will alter the relative 
price of imports and exports, and consequently imports and exports will adjust to restore 
equilibrium.  The model is also ‘savings-driven’, with total investment adjusting to be equal 
to savings.  The exchange rate is used as the numéraire, and is measured such that a rise in the 
exchange rate represents a depreciation of the domestic currency.   
 
3.2  Data Description 
The data for the Mauritian CGE model consists of a social accounting matrix (SAM) for the 
year 1997.  The production activities are further decomposed into 17 sectors, and no 
distinction is made between commodities and sectors.  Tourism is not identified as a distinct 
sector in the input-output table of Mauritius, and hence several adjustments are required to 
capture tourism in the model.  It is worth noting that tourism is treated as a demand 
phenomenon and is identified only on the demand side.  It is assumed that there is an 
additional group of final demand, the tourists, whom consume goods and services produced 
by the traditional sectors, and that there is no specific sector producing only for the tourists.  
In the I-O table of Mauritius, tourism demand lies partly in household consumption and partly 
in exports.  After extracting tourism demand from the latter two components, we also need to 
differentiate between tourism demand that is met from domestic production and that by 
imported goods.  Specific details on the above can be found in Gooroochurn (2002).   
 
From table 1, it can be seen that sugar milling, EPZ textiles and EPZ non-textiles are the main 
export sectors (excluding tourism exports) with 89%, 90% and 90% of output exported, 





Sugarcane 0.54 0 0 0.04
Foodcrops and Fruits 7.52 0.18 0 0.05
Livestock, Poultry and Fishing 3.07 0.02 0 0.11
Other Agriculture 2.39 0.19 0 0.08
Mining and Quarrying   2.71 0 0 0.05
Sugar Milling 0.91 0.89 0 0.05
EPZ Textiles 0.93 0.90 0 0.45
EPZ Non-textiles 0.93 0.90 0 0.60
Other Manufacturing 1.67 0.07 12.1 0.19
Electricity, Gas and Water 1.62 0 0 0.28
Construction 0.97 0 0 0.28
Wholesale and Retail Trade 1.98 0.01 2.7 0.02
Restaurants and Hotels 1.20 0 95.4 0.06
Transport and Communication 1.71 0.15 61.4 0.39
Financial Services 2.83 0.15 0 0.09
Government Services 0 0 0 0.09
Other Services 1.11 0 12.3 0.05
a: Capital income divided by labour income
b: Exports (exclude tourism) divided by total demand
c: Tourism demand divided by total demand
d: Imports divided by domestic output
Table 1: Summary of Production Sectors 
respectively.  There are five sectors that are related to tourism: hotel and restaurant (95.4%), 
transport and communication (61.4%), retail and wholesale trade (2.7%), other manufacturing 
(12.1%) and other services (12.3%).  The tourism ratio, measured as the proportion of tourism 
demand out of total demand, is given in brackets.  The main importables are EPZ textiles, 
EPZ non-textiles and transport and communication sectors with an import ratio of 40% and 
above.  Other less intensive importables include the construction and electricity, gas and 
water sectors.  Non-tradeables include the sugarcane, livestock, poultry and fishing, mining 
and quarrying, wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, financial services, 
government services and other services sectors.   
 
  10The calibration process is based on the Harberger’s convention, which assumes that all prices 
in the model equal to one.  All share and shift parameters are calibrated from the SAM.  Some 
elasticity values are taken from the GTAP database (Hertel, 1997), and others are taken from 
previous studies or guessitimated judiciously.  Sensitivity analyses (reported in Gooroochurn, 
2004) are carried out on the elasticity values and the results are found to be robust.  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The welfare effects of different magnitudes of tourism boom in Mauritius are given in figure 
1.  It should be noted that in there are no distortions in the benchmark.  All taxes and 
subsidies have been removed prior to the tourism boom simulations such that the ‘real’ effects 
of the tourism boom can be estimated.  It can be seen that for expansion less than 10%, 
tourism boom is immiserizing.  With a less than perfectly elastic export demand for the 
tourism sector, there is a lower appreciation of the real exchange rate resulting in a lower 
terms of trade gains.  On the other hand, competing export sectors contract and tourist 
consumption crowds-out domestic consumption causing a reduction in welfare.  Larger export 
boom causes relatively higher terms of trade gains than contraction on other sectors, causing 
an improvement in welfare.  In our initial model with no distortions, tourism expansions 
above 10% are welfare improving.  The following sub-sections investigate the effects of 
tourism expansion under different assumptions to investigate the possibilities of tourism 





































































Figure 1: EV and Tourism Boom with no Distortions 
  114.1  Tourism Boom and Increasing Return to Scale 
Increasing return to scale in the expanding (contracting) sector is expected to increase 
(decrease) welfare due to higher (lower) efficiency.  We introduce increasing return to scale, 
with a fixed ‘Cost Reduction Ratio’ (CDR) of 0.1 to each sector at a time, and evaluate the 
welfare effects of a tourism boom of 15%.  The results are given in table 2 alongside the 
export ratio.  It can be seen that welfare effects are lower with increasing return to scale in the 
export-orientated sectors than with constant return to scale following the tourism boom.  The 
equivalent variations are also negative showing immiseration of domestic residents.   
However, tourism boom the presence of increasing returns to scale in the other sectors, 
including the tourism-related sectors, generate a higher welfare gains arising from improving 
technical efficiency in the expanding sectors.   
Export Ratio Change Immiserise
Sugarcane 0         ↓ Yes
Foodcrops and Fruits 0.2 ↑ No
Livestock, Poultry and Fishing 0 ↑ No
Other Agriculture 0.2         ↓ Yes
Mining and Quarrying   0 ↑ No
Sugar Milling 0.9         ↓ Yes
EPZ Textiles 0.9         ↓ Yes
EPZ Non-textiles 0.9         ↓ Yes
Other Manufacturing 0.1 ↑ No
Table 2: Movement of Welfare Effects of Tourism Boom of with EOS in Each Sector
Electricity, Gas and Water 0 ↑ No
Construction 0 ↑ No
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0 ↑ No
Restaurants and Hotels 0 ↑ No
Transport and Communication 0.1 ↑ No
Financial Services 0.2 ↑ No
Government Services 0 ↑ No
Other Services 0 ↑ No
↓: Lower welfare effects
↑: Higher welfare effects
 
  124.2  Tourism Boom and Trade Regime 
In the presence of trade distortions, we estimate the terms of trade, volume of trade and total 
welfare effects of a tourism boom.  Simulations are undertaken for a 15% tourism boom 
(welfare should improve without trade distortions).  The simulations are undertaken for 
import tariffs/subsidies, export taxes/subsidies and for a combination of both.  Following 
Chen and Devereux (1999), welfare is expected to be lower with higher import subsidy and 
export tax.  We run a set of dual counterfactual simulations, and found that tourism expansion 
with lower import tariffs and lead to lower welfare, and tourism expansion with higher import 
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Figure 2: EV of 15% Tourism Boom with Different Tariff Level on Final Demand 
 
It should be noted that in the above simulation, import tax is levied only on final demand.  
Hence with higher imports demand following the favourable terms of trade effect, import tax 
revenue will increase (decrease) for positive (negative) tax rates.  If import tax is levied on 
both final and intermediate demand, the welfare effects can be ambiguous.  Following the 
‘Dutch disease’ literature, the tourism boom will cause other export sectors to contract.   
Export sectors are generally large sectors using significant amount of imported intermediate 
inputs.  For example in Mauritius, intermediate imports of the two main export sectors, textile 
EPZ and non-textile EPZ, consist more than 22% of total imports.  Contraction of these 
sectors can lead to lower import tax revenue if tax is positive or higher tax revenue savings if 
import tax is negative.  Therefore, with taxes on intermediate inputs, Chen and Devereux’s 
  13argument may not hold.  In fact, in our simulations, we found increasing and positive 
equivalent variations for higher import subsidies on both intermediate and final demand.  This 
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Figure 3: Figure 2: EV Tourism Boom with Different Tariff Level on all Demand 
 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the equivalent variation following a tourism boom 
and different level of export tax/subsidy.  It can be seen that a tourism boom is more welfare 
improving in the presence of higher export subsidy and more immiserizing with higher export 
tax rate.   
 
4.3  Tourism Boom and Income Distribution 
Income distribution is closely related to poverty analysis in developing countries.  Economies 
that are highly concerned about inequality aversion will give more weight to welfare of poorer 
households whilst evaluating total domestic welfare.  The equity adjusted social welfare (SW) 





h h W SW β    (1) 
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M ∑  so that  .  M1 
and Mh are the average income level of the poorest household group and household group h, 






h β  can be regarded as representing the marginal social benefit of one unit 
of income to household group h relative to a unit to the poorest household group.  ε  is a 
positive number and can interpreted as the degree of inequality aversion.  If we are not 
concerned about inequality at all, then  0 = ε  such that  1 = h β  for all h and we are back to the 
unadjusted welfare function.  If the modeller has an aversion to inequality then ε  will be 
greater than zero such that  1 < h β  for  1 ≠ h  and becomes smaller for richer household groups.  
We are thus giving higher weight to poorer household groups.  For a value of  1 = ε  for 
example, the weight of the poorest household will be twice the weight of the household group 
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6 This formulation of the weights is commonly used in empirical studies in taxation.  See Ahmad and Stern 
(1991), Leung et al. (1999) and Madden (1989, 1995) for such applications.   with twice the income of the poorest household group.  As ε  becomes larger, the condition 
approaches the Rawlsian 'maxi-min' criterion where the aim is to maximise the welfare of the 
poorest household group; with the weight on richer household groups approaching zero and 
that on the poorest household tending to one.   
Tourism Boom: 10% 0.027 0.099 0.124
Tourism Boom: 15% 0.041 0.149 0.185
Tourism Boom: 20% 0.055 0.198 0.246
Tourism Boom: 25% 0.068 0.247 0.308
1 = ε 2 = ε 5 = ε
Table 3: Equivalent Variation for Different Inequality Aversion ( ) ε  
 
The adjusted equivalent variation is calculated using the adjusted social welfare for different 
values of ε  (ε =1,  ε =2,  ε =5) for tourism booms of 10%, 15%, 20% and 25%, and the 
results are given in table 3.  As expected welfare effects are higher for higher magnitude of 
tourism boom.  It can also be seen that for each tourism boom experiment, the equivalent 
variations are higher the greater the degree of inequality aversion ( ) ε  where welfare of poorer 
households are given more weights.  Thus, it can be concluded that tourism boom benefits the 
poorer household groups more than the richer groups.   
 
This conclusion is motivated by the source and use of imcome effects.  From table 1, it can be 
seen that the tourism-related sectors, especially the hotel and restaurant sector, are relatively 
more labour intensive.  Moreover, more than 55% of the labour are unskilled.  Therefore, 
expansion in the tourism-related sectors will tend to benefit the poorer household groups.  
This is the source of income effect.  The use of income effect is related to the proportion of 
consumption of tourism products by different household groups which is summarised in table 
4.  It can be seen that a relatively higher proportion of consumption of the hotel and restautant 
and transport and communication sectors are from higher income groups.  The tourism boom 
will tend to increase the consumption price of the above sectors.  Moreover, higher tourism 
consumption generate higher crowding-out effects on cumsumption.  Both effects will tend to 
lower welfare and with a higher proportion of consumption, the richer households will bear 
more of the burden.  The pattern of the sources and uses of income effects are similar in many 
16  countries, and hence if income distribution effects are taken into consideration, there is a 













H1 1.4 2.4 0.9 0.5 1.0
H2 10.1 19.6 7.6 4.0 5.7
H3 18.3 38.1 14.7 9.6 11.5
H4 18.5 42.4 16.4 13.0 14.2
H5 20.9 54.2 21.0 20.8 21.3
H6 11.7 32.7 12.6 12.9 13.1
H7 8.5 25.7 9.9 10.0 11.5




Table 4: Domestic Consumption of Tourism-Related Commodities Across 
               Households (%) 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides describes the economy-wide effects of a tourism boom following the 
‘Dutch disease’ literature.  It is found that a straightforward application of the ‘Dutch disease’ 
literature to a tourism boom is not appropriate because there are important differences 
between tourism and traditional exports.  For instance, a tourism boom will affect the non-
traded sector both directly via higher tourists spending and indirectly via higher domestic 
spending arising from higher income.  The conditions under which a tourism boom can be 
immiserizing are also identified from both the trade and tourism literature  They are mainly 
under the assumptions of monopoly power in the non-traded sector, foreign ownership of 
factors, crowding-out effects, increasing returns to scale, trade taxes distortions and income 
distribution.   
 
Using Mauritius as a case study, the latter three conditions are investigated empirically.  It is 
found that a tourism boom with increasing returns to scale in the export-oriented sectors leads 
to lower welfare gain and can be immiserizing.  On the other hand, increasing returns in the 
  17tourism-related sectors and non-tradeables leads to higher welfare increase following the 
tourism boom.   
 
The outcomes of the tourism boom simulation under different trade regimes are more 
complicated.  Tourism boom under the assumption of pre-existing import taxes/subsidies on 
final demand, leads to higher welfare gain with higher import tariffs.  On the other hand, the 
presence of import subsidies leads to immiserizing growth.  However, if import subsidies are 
levied on both final and intermediate demand, a tourism boom can increase welfare.  It is also 
found that a tourism boom tend to improve income distribution.   
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  20APPENDIX 
Table A.1: List of Equations Used in the Model 
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Quantity Equations 
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Expenditure Equations 
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Equilibrium Equations   
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